Ideas from 'Four Dimensionalism' by Theodore Sider [2001], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Four Dimensionalism' by Sider,Theodore [OUP 2003,0-19-926352-3]].
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expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
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14721
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Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
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14760
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Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
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14194
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Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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14745
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If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
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14740
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If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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14752
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Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
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14743
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The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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14747
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'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
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14757
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Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
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14727
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Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts'
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14738
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Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
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14726
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Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time
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14728
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4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts
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14729
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4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
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14730
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Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects
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14762
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Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts
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14731
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Temporal parts are instantaneous
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14758
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How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time?
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
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14741
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The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
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14754
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If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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14763
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Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts
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27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
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14725
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Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
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14735
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Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
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14722
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Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
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14756
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For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description
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14724
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Presentists must deny truths about multiple times
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
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14723
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Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
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14734
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The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense
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14736
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The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present
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